Although there has been a relative abundance of work done on exploring the contours of the law of cyber war, far less attention has been paid to defining a law of cyber peace applicable below the armed attack threshold. Among the most important unanswered questions is what exactly nations' due diligence obligations are to one another and to their respective private sectors. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has not yet explicitly considered this topic, though it has ruled in the Corfu Channel case that one country's territory should not be "used for acts that unlawfully harm other States." But what steps exactly do nations and companies under their jurisdiction have to take under international law to secure their networks, and what of the rights and responsibilities of transit states? This Article reviews the arguments surrounding the creation of a cybersecurity due diligence norm and argues for a proactive regime that takes into account the common but differentiated responsibilities of public and private sector actors in cyberspace. The analogy is drawn to cybersecurity due diligence in the private sector and the experience of the 2014 National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") Framework to help guide and broaden the discussion.
INTRODUCTION
Rarely does a day go by in which some variety of cyber attack is not front-page news. From Sony to JP Morgan, Saudi Aramco to the Ukraine crisis, cybersecurity is increasingly taking center stage in diverse arenas of geopolitics, international economics, security, and law. In mid-2015 alone numerous high-profile incidents came to light involving both the public and private sectors, including the breach of more than twentyone million current and former federal employee's private information from the U.S.
Office of Personnel Management.
2 Yet despite the increasing proliferation of these incidents, the field of international cybersecurity law and policy remains relatively immature. For example, although there has been a relative abundance of work done on exploring the contours of the law of cyber war, far less attention has been paid to defining a law of cyber peace applicable below the armed attack threshold. 3 This is surprising since the vast majority of cyber attacks do not cross this threshold. 4 Among the most important unanswered questions is what exactly are nations' due diligence obligations to secure their networks and to prosecute or extradite cyber attackers. The International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") has some guiding jurisprudence on this point, such as Corfu Channel case that one country's territory should not be "used for acts that unlawfully harm other States." 5 But analogizing is required, and these cases are not dispositive. A wealth of information is available in the arena of cybersecurity due diligence from both the public and private sectors that has, to date, been largely untapped to help answer the question of what steps nations and companies under their jurisdiction should take to secure their networks, along with clarifying the rights and responsibilities of transit states.
This Article reviews the arguments surrounding the creation of a cybersecurity due diligence norm and argues for a proactive regime that takes into account the common but differentiated responsibilities of various stakeholders in cyberspace. The analogy is drawn to cybersecurity due diligence in the private sector and the experience of the 2014 National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework ("NIST Framework") to help guide and enrich the discussion. 6 Ultimately we argue that international jurisprudence has an invaluable role to play, but the experience of national regulators and the private sector is also informative in this space especially given the robust and necessary public-private cross-pollination occurring with regards to clarifying and spreading cybersecurity best practices. Yet despite its importance, this is a topic that has received remarkably little attention in the literature to date.
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This Article is structured as follows. We begin by reviewing the applicable ICJ jurisprudence and literature on cybersecurity due diligence under international law. We then turn to national case studies to help flesh out a potential cybersecurity due diligence norm focusing on the cyber powers of the United States, Germany, and China. Finally, we review lessons from the private-sector cybersecurity due diligence context focusing on mergers and acquisitions and supply chain management to better understand contemporary risk mitigation realities and conclude with some implications for managers and policymakers.
I. UNPACKING DUE DILIGENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law has been defined as "the body of legal rules," norms, and standards that applies "between sovereign States" and non-State actors, including international organizations and multinational companies, enjoying legal personality. 8 The primary sources of international law include treaties, general principles of law, and custom, the third of which requires evidence of State practice that nations follow out of a sense of legal obligation. 9 The subsidiary sources of international law include judicial decisions and scholarly writing. Given the recent nature and rapid development of cybercapabilities, there are comparatively few treaties that specifically address the rights and obligations of States vis-a-vis these cyber-capabilities, with the notable exception of the Budapest Convention discussed below. 10 Absent a robust treaty regime and given the geopolitical difficulties of negotiating new agreements in this area, it is vital to clarify the role of customary international law as it relates to due diligence.
A. An Introduction to Customary International Cybersecurity Law
A vital component of customary international cybersecurity law was articulated by the ICJ case Nicaragua v. United States, which involved a dispute over the United
States' involvement with the Contra rebellion in Nicaragua. 11 In Nicaragua, the ICJ held that customary international obligations would arise from the consistent, widespread practice of States engaging in specific acts or omissions, performed out of a sense of obligation that such acts or omissions were required by international law (opinio juris).
The combination of State practice and opinio juris, performed by a significant number of
States and without the express disavowal of a significant number of States, would give rise to international obligations under customary international law. The underlying rationale behind this logic is that this combination reflects a consensus in the international community that the actions taken represent an unspoken international obligation.
Despite Nicaragua's clear articulation of the rule, in practice the development of customary international law presents a temporal dilemma, since for a State to engage in actions out of a sense of legal duty, this presupposes the existence of such a duty, and Proving opinio juris, however, is a difficult task, especially in the cyber context.
The temporal dilemma means that pointing to existing rules is oftentimes complicated, so the preferred method is to identify broad principles. The ICJ suggests that these broad principles may be found by looking to treaties, as such accords evidence a widespread agreement among States, and indeed most courts rely on treaties to identify opinio juris, often exclusively so. 15 language. 17 Similarly, the Organization of American States has also encouraged member
States to join the Budapest Convention and to increase regional cooperation to mitigate cybercrime, whereas a nonbinding U.N. General Assembly Resolution calls on States to "eliminate safe havens" for cybercriminals. 18 While it is unlikely that a non-signatory
State would be bound to the specific terms of a treaty to which it did not signparticularly in the short term-that treaty may still serve to identify broad principles that form opinio juris, and thereby can build a foundation for international obligations.
The search for cybersecurity opinio juris is further complicated by the multifaceted cyber threat comprising cybercrime, espionage, terrorism, and war. While the classification of State cyber-activities is a well-known problem, 19 the mere fact that these activities are so widespread suggests a lack of opinio juris against aggressive State cyber-activity below the armed-attack threshold. This is reinforced by discussions of the international law relating to espionage, which is largely unregulated outside the law of war context. 20 Similarly, domestic cybersecurity practices are highly variable and can involve the surreptitious installation of malware-as alleged of Chinese telecommunications providers and the NSA alike-discussed further below. 21 Given the relative lack of multilateral progress, claiming a widespread consensus for an underlying cybersecurity norm is challenging; a situation that is only marginally helped by investigating related ICJ jurisprudence on the subject.
B. ICJ Jurisprudence as it Relates to Cybersecurity Due Diligence
Although the ICJ has never directly addressed cybersecurity due diligence requirements, the cases discussing due diligence generally can serve as broad guideposts
for States from which we may infer cyber-specific applications. It is worth noting that 17 For an extended discussion of these and other applicable treaty regimes, see operation that falls below a "use of force" can still qualify as an "intervention." 48 An example of this category of cyber-intervention is likely Stuxnet, a sophisticated cyber weapon designed to target Iranian nuclear facilities. 49 Classification of Stuxnet has been a contentious issue, with some arguing it was a "use of force" and others that it constituted an "armed attack," but Stuxnet at a minimum met the requirements of an intervention.
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The governing principle for an intervention is that it must be "coercive" towards activity protected by State sovereignty. Therefore, it is not sufficient for an activity to be merely coercive; it must also be coercive towards the State's choice of political, A potentially more difficult case of a cyber-intervention is the anonymity software Tor, which is a software package that was originally developed by the U.S.
Navy to facilitate secure and anonymous online communication, and is currently freely available online around the world. 57 Through a process known as "onion routing," Tor makes attempts to monitor or censor network traffic difficult; indeed, Tor's efficacy has led to the NSA referring to it as "the King of high-secure, low-latency Internet anonymity." 58 As such, Tor can facilitate the free speech of individuals living in countries that heavily control Internet traffic, including China and its "Great Firewall." 59 While championed by some as a victory for free speech, this service also represents an affront to Chinese State sovereignty. Though the U.S. government is not directly providing Tor to Chinese nationals, the U.S. Navy did develop the software and it was U.S. policy to permit Tor to be freely available. Given that cryptography was on the U.S.
Munitions List until 1992 and high-level encryption remains subject to export controls, 60 Tor presents a closer analogy to Nicaragua and represents how difficult the notion of non-intervention can be in a digital environment.
Taking the broadest potential interpretation of "intervention" that is at the heart of 63 Considering the ever-expanding importance of the Internet to States, including to those States' political, economic, social, and cultural systems, this raises concerns in some quarters over the outsized role that the U.S.
currently occupies in the development of the Internet and online services. 64 Considering the State practice on intervention, however, there seems to be a growing consensus that international obligations fall not on the offending State to restrain any undue influence, but on the victim State to affirmatively exclude it. In response to the pervasive use of social media by protest groups, numerous countries either blocked Twitter, as with Iran, 65 or specifically requested that Twitter censor certain accounts and tweets within their territory, as with Egypt. 66 In this way, Twitter's code is the law, and
States wishing to impose more speech-restricting standards must ask Twitter to affirmatively censor content within their borders, or block it entirely. Likewise, China's response to tools like Tor has not been to seek their removal by the U.S. government, but rather to prevent their download and to restrict their functionality within Chinese networks. 67 can be justified when "enforcing a principle," 83 thus allowing for laxity in the proportionality assessment.
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Applying these principles to cyber-countermeasures suggests that States will enjoy tentatively broad discretion in the choice of response to an internationally unlawful act. Since there is no requirement that countermeasures take the same form as the precipitating activity, cyber-countermeasures may be used in response to non-cyber unlawful activity, and vice versa. And among these cyber-responses, activities may vary widely, from more aggressive "hack back" operations against the offending State, to more passive activities, such as the termination of packets routed through the victim State. 85 Yet some activity will likely fall beyond the bounds of international law, such as the cyber equivalent of diverting a river, 86 and may be given a wide berth in turn.
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Adding upon this loose framework, the primary substantive limit on countermeasures -proportionality -is weakened by the dearth of cyber-examples, particularly in the due diligence context, as well as the difficulty in quantifying cyberoperations, and the principle that economically disproportionate countermeasures are 83 Id. at 443-444. 84 Although other requirements are often invoked regarding the legality of countermeasures, Gabc̆íkovo-Nagymaros only expressly acknowledged one: that the countermeasures must be to induce the offending State to comply with its international obligations. See Gabc̆íkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 78, at 56-57, para. 87. This is sometimes reframed to require that countermeasures not be punitive, and is generally accepted to encompass a requirement that countermeasures, when possible, be reversible (that the countermeasures can be undone once the offending State is in compliance with their international obligations ("GATT"), employs a broad exception for "essential security interests," 105 which effectively serves as an un-appealable, self-determined "get out of jail free card."
Despite the GATT's restriction on unilateral economic sanctions, the United States has on multiple occasions used the national security exception to impose unilateral economic sanctions, most recently against Russia. 106 This exception for national security is a frequently bemoaned aspect of international law, but nevertheless suggests a fundamental valuation on the part of the international community that State sovereignty is to be given preference on issues implicating essential security interests. Therefore, any cybersecurity due diligence standards must be understood to likely contain a national security exception, which could lead to the exception swallowing the rule. Ultimately, the existence of these caveats and exceptions makes any definitive statement regarding the status of international due diligence standards that much more difficult, leading to the necessity of examining public-and private-sector approaches to help clarify the missing elements to a cybersecurity due diligence norm.
II. NATIONAL AND PRIVATE-SECTOR APPROACHES TO CYBERSECURITY DUE DILIGENCE
As was discussed in the previous section, international law, while informative, does not spell out in detail how nations should go about enhancing their cybersecurity to account for emerging due diligence obligations. As a result, it is helpful to consider established and proposed both public-and private sector approaches for defining due diligence. Such national strategies could, in time, crystallize into customary international law as state practice clarifies. 107 Similarly, given the extensive public-private crosspollination of cybersecurity best practices, private-sector efforts aimed at enhancing cybersecurity are informative given the extent to which they are shaping national 105 policymaking with the NIST Framework being a case in point. 108 Thus, this final section begins by discussing several national case studies of cybersecurity due diligence including the United States, Germany, and China as a first step to uncovering a due diligence governance spectrum. 109 We then offer a due diligence matrix to better inform the discussion before moving on to examine the extent to which cybersecurity is entering the due diligence process of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. private sector context.
Finally, we conclude with several observations for how industry cybersecurity norms are translating into national policymaking, and what that means for managers, policymakers, and the field of cybersecurity due diligence generally.
A. National Approaches to Regulating Cybersecurity Due Diligence
This sub-section briefly reviews the national approaches of the United States, Germany, and China with regards to cybersecurity due diligence regulation. These case studies were chosen not only because these nations are among the world's leading cyber powers, but also to provide common and civil law, as well as developed and emerging market perspectives on this issue. This analysis is not meant to be dispositive of the topic under consideration, but rather to provide a snapshot for how this influential subset of nations is approaching the topic of cybersecurity due diligence. 110 Further research is required to flesh out whether the noted trends are playing out globally.
United States
The topic of cybersecurity due diligence per se has not received an inordinate amount of attention by the Obama Administration, though it has referenced the topic in 2015), http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/promoting-norms-cyberspace/p36358?cid=nlc-npbnews2015_national_conference_confirmation_and_background--link22-20150602&sp_mid=48790069&sp_rid=a3plZ3VyYUBjZnIub3JnS0 (arguing that the U.S. government should take the following three steps to reinvigorate a norms-based approach to multilateral cybersecurity policymaking: "reform U.S. intelligence activities to make them more consistent with the publicly expressed norms of Internet openness that the United States is trying to establish; disclose more convincing evidence when trying to shame actors that do not abide by cybersecurity norms; and encourage other states and civil society actors to take a leading role in norm promotion-even when this cuts against U.S. interests.").
4,000 installations spread across some 88 countries. 115 Yet the majority of U.S. efforts in this space have been focused on securing vulnerable critical infrastructure ("CI").
Although Congress has been active in this regard, successive administrations-including those of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama-have pushed the ball forward on securing vulnerable CI.
Most recently, President Obama declared the U.S. CI to be a "strategic national asset" in 2009 though a fully integrated U.S. cybersecurity policy has yet to be established. 116 In the face of Congressional inaction, President Obama issued an executive order that, among other things, expanded public-private information sharing and established the NIST Framework comprised partly of private-sector best practices that companies could adopt to better secure CI. 117 This Framework is important since, even though its critics argue that it helps to solidify a reactive stance to the nation's cybersecurity challenges, 118 it is arguably spurring the development of a standard of cybersecurity care in the United States that plays into discussions of due diligence. 119 In particular, the NIST Framework harmonizes industry best practices to provide, its proponents argue, a flexible and cost-effective approach to enhancing cybersecurity that assists owners and operators of critical infrastructure in assessing and managing cyber risk. Although the NIST Framework has only been out for a relatively short time, already some private-sector clients are receiving the advice that if their "cybersecurity practices were ever questioned during litigation or a regulatory investigation, the 'standard' for 'due diligence' was now the NIST Cybersecurity Framework." 120 Over time, the NIST Framework not only has the potential to shape a standard of care for domestic critical infrastructure organizations but also could help to harmonize global cybersecurity best practices for the private sector writ large given active NIST collaborations with a number of nations including the United Kingdom, Japan, Korea, Estonia, Israel, and Germany.
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Germany
Germany's cybersecurity due diligence efforts rely on close collaboration between the public and private sectors, nationally and globally. 122 Long known for its strong national data protection law with fines up to EUR 300,000, Germany is moving now to mandate strict cybersecurity standards for CI, and assign the responsibility to protect users and secure CI to service providers and operators of CI. 123 In particular, the federal government approved the German Cybersecurity Strategy ("Cyber- 
China
According to Booz Allen, while the United States and Germany rank second and fourth respectively in terms of their 2015 global cyber power ranking, China comes in at a, perhaps somewhat surprising, thirteenth place. 133 Part of the reason for this lower ranking is that China applies tight controls over its domestic Internet in order to advance the Communist party's economic, political, and military interests and to help secure its rule while having a less robust legal and regulatory environment to enhance national China is pursuing cyber diplomacy on an array of fronts. Among other actions, China is furthering the multilateral cybersecurity initiative with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is negotiating a bilateral cybersecurity treaty with Russia, is involved in a U.S.-China working group to diffuse tensions around mutually alleged cyber exploitations, and has been drafting cybersecurity-relevant proposals and declarations to garner support from like-minded states at the into a "cyber power." 139 The speech coincided with the establishment of the "Central Cyber Security and Informatization Leading Group," which under the leadership of President Xi Jinping will guide China's cybersecurity policy efforts.
In many ways, China's cybersecurity strategy is broader in scope than either its U.S. or German counterparts. In addition to addressing the security of networks and computers, it includes censorship of content and information control to a far greater extent than is the case in these Western nations. It is the Chinese government's official position that "properly guiding Internet opinion is a major measure for protecting Internet information security." 140 China's take on cybersecurity is reflected in the idea of Internet sovereignty and its use of the Internet as a means to build up a domestic information economy and secure network infrastructure that benefits domestic development and political stability. 
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Similar to MLPS, and as part of its economic policy, China has attempted to establish its own wireless network standard ("WAPI"). In reaction to NSA revelations, it announced work on independent, Chinese operating systems for desktop computers as In summary, China expresses the need for the control of information and exclusion of foreign owned-security technologies in order to protect its societal stability.
As a result, its strategy focuses on national security and economic advancement.
Elements of cybersecurity due diligence consequently look quite different when compared to the U.S. or German cases, demonstrating the difficulty of crafting a global norm in this space. However, one could potentially construe a Chinese version of cybersecurity due diligence that is at the other end of a possible spectrum from the U.S. has long alluded U.S. policymakers, and China's broader economic and national security efforts. To get a better sense of how these nations vary in their treatment of cybersecurity due diligence, we have generated a matrix comparing these countries' due diligence responsibilities. . 155 The cyber due diligence matrix in Table 1 reflects key aspects of a due diligence obligation for cybersecurity as the authors perceive and define it. We gained analogical insights from key cases of international due diligence obligations as described above in Part I, and complemented those by looking for due diligence characteristics in three leading cyber powers: the U.S., Germany, and China. This helped us to chart out comparative factors applicable in the cyber domain. Nicholas Tsagourias's cyber due diligence paper, the 2015 ITU Global Cybersecurity Index, and conversations at the 2015 workshop on 'Controlling Economic Cyber Espionage' at Syracuse University, June 18-19, were used to help define and structure the cyber due diligence matrix. 
Cyber Due Diligence Matrix
B. Lessons from the Private Sector
Among the criticisms of the NIST Framework is that, although it does a good job at promoting general "cyber hygiene" for those organizations that implement it, it is less well suited to protecting firms from sophisticated and targeted cyber attacks sometimes called Advanced Persistent Threats ("APTs"). Indeed, there is a cybersecurity due diligence industry emerging in which the NIST Framework, and for that matter the German BSI Standards, play a role but are only one aspect of a larger decision-making 191 The BSI issues an annual report on the state of cybersecurity that addresses cyber risks and threats. Together, these frameworks, and others, provide the beginnings of a cybersecurity due diligence standard guiding judges as they work through causes of action such as breach of fiduciary duty and negligence resulting from data breaches. 211 The same goes for partnerships with vendors. The Target breach, for example, which wound up exposing some 40 million credit card numbers, was the result of lax security from a HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) vendor that for some reason had access to myriad Target systems well beyond HVAC networks. 212 Despite some progress, there is still a long way to go to enhance private-sector cybersecurity due diligence, including in the M&A context. Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer, a global law firm, for example, conducted a survey in which they found that "78 per cent of global respondents believe cyber security is not analysed in great depth or specifically quantified as part of the M&A due diligence process, despite 83 per cent saying they believe a deal could be abandoned if previous breaches were identified and 90 per cent saying such breaches could reduce the value of the deal." 213 Similarly, only 39 percent of respondents "say they make cyber security policies . . . a condition precedent that is addressed prior to completion" of a transaction. 214 In other words, despite growing recognition as to the scale and scope of the multifaceted cyber threat facing firms, many remain predominantly reactive. 215 In order to improve the status quo firms must leverage the above cybersecurity best practices among many others ranging from utilizing risk-based data management to minimizing the danger of insider threats through meshing corporate and human resources policies and reviewing the cybersecurity track records of vendors and potential partners. 216 Still, that might not be enough.
The end result of all this is that there is a push among IT professionals to go beyond mere due diligence and move toward the use of real-time analytics and other cybersecurity best practices to monitor vendors' systems. 217 The lesson here is constant vigilance, e.g., letting an initial process of cybersecurity due diligence be the first, and not the last, word in an ongoing proactive and comprehensive cybersecurity policy that promotes cyber hygiene along with the best practices essential for battling APTs. 218 Such a policy should be widely disseminated and regularly vetted as part of an overarching enterprise risk management process, along with having an incident response plan in place that includes private and public information sharing mechanisms.
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C. A Polycentric Approach to Promoting Due Diligence and Cyber Peace
These private sector best practices should inform national and indeed international debates playing out in the field of cybersecurity due diligence. Together, such bottom-up experimentation could be considered a polycentric approach to unpacking the field of cybersecurity due diligence. This multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multisectoral model, 220 championed by scholars including Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom, challenges orthodoxy by demonstrating the benefits of self-diligence, including the need to undertake effective cost-benefit analysis, 226 conduct supply chain monitoring with an eye toward spotting hardware and software vulnerabilities, and institute governance strategies that permit ample space for innovation while still mandating proven best practices. 227 The latter goal may be furthered by, for example, requiring NIST Framework compliance for all suppliers and potential partners, something that more firms are undertaking. For example, in early 2015 Bank of America will announced "that it is using the Framework and will also require it of its vendors[,]"
while "QVC is announcing that it is using the Cybersecurity Framework in its risk management." 228 Such innovative efforts are critical to furthering the cause of cyber peace, especially when coupled with effective cybersecurity regulation as was discussed in the German case study. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a UN agency specializing in information and communication technologies, pioneered some of the early work in the field by defining "cyber peace" in part as "a universal order of cyberspace" built on a "wholesome state of tranquility, the absence of disorder or disturbance and violence . . . ." 229 Although certainly desirable, such an outcome is politically and technically unlikely, at least in the near term. 230 That is why cyber peace is defined here not as the absence of conflict, a state of affairs that may be called negative cyber peace. 231 Rather, it is the construction of a network of multilevel regimes that promote global, just, and sustainable cybersecurity by clarifying the rules of the road for companies and countries alike to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict, crime, and espionage to levels comparable to other business and national security risks. To achieve this goal, a new approach to cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from the public and private sectors to enhance cybersecurity due diligence. Working together through polycentric partnerships, we can mitigate the risk of cyber war by laying the groundwork for a positive cyber peace that respects human rights, spreads Internet access along with best practices, and strengthens governance mechanisms by fostering multi-stakeholder collaboration. 232 Already some of the public-and private-sector efforts highlighted in this paper may be bearing fruit with, by some estimates, the severity of cyber attacks beginning to plateau and "an emerging norm against the use of severe state-based cybertactics" emerging.
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CONCLUSION
The field of international cybersecurity due diligence remains a complex, demanding, and difficult arena, but one that requires sustained academic, private, and public engagement if progress is to be made. An array of paths forward beckons. For example, States could exercise due diligence through passive means, promoting resiliency in domestic and partner nation's networks. 234 Warning systems for various types of cyber attacks facilitated by cyber emergency response teams, active (and twoway) private-sector information sharing and collaboration on identifying and spreading cybersecurity best practices, and a robust cyber hygiene campaign may be considered other essential elements of cybersecurity due diligence. Other best practices include partioning access to code and systems, audits and regular penetration testing, and promoting redundancy and parallel network construction to build further resiliency, as well as harnessing cybersecurity expertise beyond one's own organizational boundaries through bug bounty and vulnerability reward programs. 235 The NIST Framework, and the related standards it references, provides a conceptual toolbox to identify gaps in an organization's cybersecurity readiness that both public and private sector actors should be aware, along with the German BSI Standards and Chinese equivalents. There is plenty of low-hanging fruit. After all, the Australian government hasreportedly been succcessful in preventing 85 percent of cyber attacks through following three common sense techniques: application whitelisting (only permitting pre-approved programs to operate on networks), regularly patching applications and operating systems, and "minimizing the number of people on a network who have 'administrator' privileges." 236 Over time, as legal harmonization progresses, there will be increasing opportunities to build out cybersecurity norms, including those surrounding the question of due diligence. Already, a number of national governments referenced above, and even some companies such as Microsoft, have released lists of draft norms for stakeholder consideration. 237 Given both the rich cross-pollination of cybersecurity best practices and the cyber threat posed by a huge range of attackers to the public and private sectors, conceptions of cybersecurity due diligence should be gleaned from existing customary international law but built out through a review of industry norms that are in turn informing national policies. Achieving some measure of cyber peace requires the active
